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Abstract:
How can India’s reactions to the Arab Spring be explained? Why did India react differently to the 
Libyan and Syrian cases? How do India’s responses justify its aspiration to take an active role 
in an emerging multilateral international order? This paper attempts to answer these questions 
by analyzing India’s major interests in the MENA region. India’s voting behavior vis-à-vis the UN 
resolutions during its Security Council tenure offers a critical empirical baseline supporting this 
analysis. The paper highlights that India’s traditional foreign policy based on the non-alignment 
and non-interventionist principles have been driven by its economy, energy and diaspora-related 
interests towards the MENA region. The Arab Spring created a dilemma for India in its foreign 
policy making and a partial deviation from the traditional foreign policy approach, especially in 
multilateral platforms. Despite these challenges, this paper argues that India successfully resisted 
the wave of the Arab Spring.
Introduction
The Indian Republic has undergone dramatic changes 
during the past two decades. The country has 
developed into a rising economic power and an aspiring 
global player since Manmohan Singh’s, the Finance 
Minister at the time, liberalization agenda in the early 
1990s. India has the third biggest economy in terms 
of purchasing power parity and is en route to overtake 
China as the most populous country. In line with its 
economic development, India has sought increasing 
leverage in the international sphere and is part of the 
G20, the BRICS, and the G7+5. Furthermore, India has 
been seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) through the G4.
The last days of 2010 witnessed a series of public 
uprisings that erupted in Tunisia shortly after the self-
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and quickly spilled 
over to other MENA countries. The demonstrations 
spreading from Sidi Bouzid to Tunis acted as a catalyst 
for similar protests in other Arab countries, shaking the 
Arab world from Libya to Syria. Protests in Bahrain 
and Kuwait, the fall of long-standing rulers in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Yemen, as well as the developing civil wars 
in Syria and Libya dominated international headlines 
and political agendas for years to come. During the 
spring of 2011, the topic began to penetrate Indian 
public discourse, academic circles, and think tanks. 
The audience both inside and out of India expected 
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a decisive response from India, particularly since the 
country occupied a non-permanent seat in the UNSC 
from 2011 to 2012.
While Western powers were quick to side with the 
public, India as the most populous democracy and as 
an ambitious power was cautious to react.1 Scholars 
such as Satish Chandra and Sushant Sareen severely 
criticize what they perceived as an “inexplicable” and 
“deafening” silence.2 Because of India’s vital interests in 
the region, they argue the necessity for India to clearly 
state its “policy and position on the events sweeping 
through the Arab world.”3
A closer look at India’s reactions to the Arab uprisings 
reveals curious variations in India’s overall engagement 
pattern with several “Arab Spring” countries. While 
India stayed on the sidelines during the most critical 
moments of the Arab uprisings, it found itself in a 
position to react to the situation in Libya and Syria, 
which were both on the agenda of high priority in the 
UNSC during India’s tenure. India’s inconsistent record 
of voting was found to be “indecisive”4  by both domestic 
and Western voices.
In spite of this apparent dichotomy in reaction between 
Indian leadership and domestic and international public 
opinion, little scholarly attention has been paid to the 
analysis of India’s response to the Arab uprisings. In 
produce. India mainly imported goods such as military 
hardware or oil for the purpose of ensuring national 
and economic survival.6 Secondly, India underlined 
that political and diplomatic opportunities with global 
players and regional actors can improve trade relations 
with those countries.7
The transition from a closed to an open economy by 
eliminating trade barriers and producing trade reforms 
resulted in a dramatic increase in India’s trade volume. 
In 2009, India’s trade volume in reports on the largest 
economies in the world published by the International 
Monetary Fund, United Nations and World Bank.8  In 
2013, India’s GDP was approximately $1.87 trillion 
(GDP current $US).9  India’s grouping with the powerful 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 
block also fostered its economic cooperation with 
the other affluent members of this rising community. 
According to the Indian Department of Commerce, 
China is India’s largest trading partner among the BRIC 
countries with a total trade of 65,8 billion dollars.10
For India, the most important trade partners have 
been with countries in the Middle East, particularly 
the Gulf States. There has been remarkable growth in 
trade relations and economic cooperation with those 
countries especially after the Cold War in comparison 
to their relations until 1990s.11 Table 1 shows that the 
rate of India’s exports and imports with West Asia and 
GCC countries has been stable in the last four years.
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light of the geographical significance of the Arab Spring 
to India in West Asia, this article’s main objective is 
to fill this vacuum by exploring India’s foreign policy 
response to the Arab Spring. It evaluates the change 
and continuity in Indian foreign policy toward West 
Asia with respect to the challenges of the Arab Spring. 
The changing geopolitical landscape results in a 
rethinking and recalibration of the policies of regional 
and international actors toward the new Arab political 
geography. The response of Indian policy makers to 
the Arab Spring will be analyzed by paying special 
attention to the extent in which the changing political 
situation led them to deviate from a traditional non-
interventionist policy. Consequently, shedding light on 
the following three consecutive questions is imperative. 
First, how can India’s reactions be explained? Second, 
why do the Libyan and Syrian cases differ from all 
others? Third, how do they fit with India’s aspirations to 
take an active role in emerging multilateral international 
order?
India’s Interests in the MENA Region
Using the strategy of nonalignment as a tool, India’s silent 
stance in the Arab Spring was motivated by securing its 
economic and geopolitical interests and ensuring the 
safety of the Indian Diaspora in those regions. However, 
this lethargic attitude stirred a number of reactions both 
domestically and internationally, particularly among 
those who pursue interventionist policies. A number of 
speculations over India’s rationale appear to associate 
the country’s non-assertive stance with its desire to 
maintain stable relations with countries in West Asia 
and other global players. These relations are mainly 
built on India’s political, economic, and energy security 
interests. In contrast to criticism from other parts of 
the world, India has so far successfully performed 
protectionist policies in the spheres deemed critical 
for its survival. For this reason, India has abandoned 
protectionism and pursued economic liberalization.5 
Overall, taking a closer look at Indian interests in West 
Asia can highlight Indian reactions toward the Arab 
Spring. 
India had never been a global economic power until 
the 1990s. However, in the late 1990s, the shift in 
mindset among Indian policy makers toward economic 
liberalization largely influenced the reputation of the 
country. It is argued that there are two significant 
reasons behind this shift. First, India needed to establish 
strong economic ties with other countries in order to 
import goods that they themselves were unable to 
Table 1: India’s Total Import-Export Rate with West Asia-GCC:
1. The values are in US$ dollar million.
2. West Asia and GCC countries for Government of India’s data includes Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.
3. The data was taken from the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & 
Industry, Department of Commerce.
Despite the fact that India altered its protectionist 
position in the economic sphere based on the non-
aligned movement, the country always avoided taking 
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99,722.05 140,179.50 143,302.06 134,445.78 74,344.54
Export
Total
50,236.15 54,896.16 62,409.71 61,288.01 37,711.52
Total Trade 149,958.20 195,075.66 205,711.77 195,733.79 112,056.06
with its energy suppliers. Given India’s population, the 
country is dependent on other countries as its domestic 
energy supply is very limited while it demands about 3.5 
million barrels of oil per day.18 India places emphasis 
on having sufficient energy sources in order to improve 
the economic and military capacity.19 Problems in the 
Middle East forced India to reevaluate its position in 
this new challenging environment. There is a debate 
about to what extent relations between India and Iran 
can be effective. Although Iran is one of the most 
important energy partners for India, this partnership 
puts India’s stable relations with the US and Israel at 
risk. Therefore, this highlights the need for New Delhi 
to maintain a balance in its relations to crucial actors.
How is India’s relation with the countries that experienced 
uprisings? India was one of the few countries that 
successfully achieved to steer its relations clear of 
this difficult environment of intense civil conflicts and 
protests in the Arab world. During the Arab Spring, 
Indian foreign policy makers sought to follow a non-
interventionist policy. In fact, India’s stance during the 
Arab Spring was very much motivated by securing 
its economic and political interests and ensuring the 
safety of Indian diaspora in those regions. According to 
numbers provided by the Ministry of Overseas Indian 
Affairs (Table 2), the Indian diaspora in the MENA 
region reached 6 million in 2012. According to the 
World Bank, the remitted money from Indian diasporas 
in Gulf countries was around “$64 billion during 2011-
2012”.20
When the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, one of New 
Delhi’s top priorities was securing the welfare of 
the Indian diaspora in that region.21 Although India 
did not react to first uprisings in Tunisia, the official 
position changed when conflicts spilled to Egypt and 
other countries. While the Indian diaspora in Tunisia 
numbered at 199, there were over 3,600 Indians in 
Egypt (Table 2). 
India’s Response to the Arab Spring
Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen
Caution and self-interest have been the primary tenets 
of India’s foreign policy since the Cold War. Strictly 
adhering to the principle of non-interference, India 
acted as a rational player while looking after its core 
interests in the MENA region. How were these ideas 
reflected in New Delhi’s bilateral reactions to the Arab 
uprisings?
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sides in regional or international conflicts. India was 
able to achieve good political and economic relations 
with certain countries by avoiding taking sides in 
regional disputes. Therefore, it can be said that India’s 
reticence was strategically used as a tool to ensure 
stable economic relations with each actor in the region. 
In the instance of Iran and Saudi Arabia, India has 
positive ties with both and avoids taking sides in the 
conflict. In other words, up until today, India has acted 
in a strategic way to protect the balance in its relations 
with Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the Non Alignment 2.0, 
scholars also emphasize the importance of maintaining 
a strategic engagement with West Asia, particularly 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Khilnani et al. express that:
“The other key principle that should guide our strategic 
engagement with West Asia is the avoidance of sharp 
choices. In particular, we should try and steer clear of 
the escalating rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
We have major interests in our relationships with both 
these countries, and need to strike a careful balance in 
our dealings with each. The acquisition of overt nuclear 
weapons capability by Iran is undesirable. An additional 
nuclear weapons state in our strategic neighborhood 
will make regional stability more precarious.“12
Relations between India and Saudi Arabia have shown 
remarkable growth in the last decade.13 Saudi Arabia is 
one of India’s largest trade partners with a total trade 
at $48,6 billion during 2013-2014.14 Furthermore, as 
Table 2 shows that Saudi Arabia hosted a number of 
Indians with a population of 1.7 million in 2012. Most 
have migrated to Saudi Arabia to work in sectors such 
as infrastructure, education and health.15 Moreover, 
thanks to its progressive relations with Saudi Arabia, 
India has an open access to the Caspian Sea and 
Afghanistan. India also enjoys solid economic, energy, 
and geopolitical ties with Iran. Iran is India’s second 
largest energy supplier.16
A few scholars, however, argue that India should 
heed caution in the post-Arab Spring environment 
where conflicting interests and religious tensions have 
escalated to a great extent. For instance, Mukherjee 
argues that “India needs to play her cards carefully, 
especially after the Arab Spring, when the divide 
between the Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shia Iran is 
accentuating and Saudi Arabia fears that Iran might 
meddle and disturb other Sunni Arab regimes in the 
region, such as Bahrain.”17
India also has a strong interest in securing its relations 
In line with its traditional non-interference principle, 
India’s general reaction to the Arab Spring was also 
dominated by caution and restraint. India only reacted 
to five out of all the public uprisings that occurred 
during the Arab Spring through its main foreign policy 
institution, the Ministry of External Affairs. The Indian 
government refrained from releasing a response in 
countries it did not perceive as posing a threat to its 
core interests. New Delhi did not immediately react to 
the popular upheavals in some of the Arab countries; 
it rather waited for some time to formulate an official 
reaction to the emerging situations in Egypt, Bahrain, 
Yemen, Syria, and Libya.22    
    
However, a distinction needs to be made between 
Libya and Syria and all other countries in the Arab 
Spring. The former two were subject to scrutiny in 
the UNSC, where India held a non-permanent seat 
between 2011 and 2012. International deliberations on 
Syria and Libya forced New Delhi to adopt a slightly 
different strategy than in the past. Before discussing 
India’s reaction to situations in Syria and Libya, we 
will examine its response to the uprisings in other 
countries.   
The Indian government did not officially issue a 
statement when protests broke out in Tunisia in 
December 2010. Its first reaction to the Arab uprisings 
came with the Egyptian protests. On January 29, 2011, 
twelve days after an Egyptian man set himself on fire 
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in front of the Egyptian parliament23 and four days 
after large-scale protests erupted, the Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs issued a travel advisory for Indian 
citizens. The statement assured the safety of the Indian 
diaspora in Egypt and set the wheels in motion for 
establishing a crisis desk for the diaspora in Cairo.24 
Put differently, the safety of the 3,600 Indians living 
in Egypt triggered the first Indian reaction. Because 
only approximately 200 Indians lived in Tunisia and no 
significant trade or energy relations were at stake, the 
Indian government had no incentive to get involved. 
The safety of Indian citizens abroad was the main topic 
of most of the official statements.    
      
India first commented on the political situation in Egypt 
on the day a special Air India flight from Cairo had 
been completed.25 India refrained from siding with the 
protestors. Instead, it called for “strength and stability,” 
“prosperity for the region,” and reiterated the “friendly 
ties” between the Indian and Egyptian people.26 The 
Indian government thereby highlighted its preference 
for stability in Egypt, which secures the safety of its 
diaspora, remittances, and economic investments, 
as well as in the region, which is vital importance for 
energy supply. 
In refraining from supporting either side, New Delhi 
sought to ensure good ties with both the people and 
the governments and institutions that are related 
to its interests. Thus, no matter the outcome, India 
could pursue its positive relations with Egypt after the 
protests. By remaining cautious, India aimed to create 
a win-win situation during this highly unstable period in 
Egypt. When Mubarak stepped down, India remained 
discreet in its reaction. While welcoming the decision, 
the Ministry of External Affairs again emphasized the 
friendly ties as well as its preference for stability, peace, 
and prosperity.27
As previously discussed, New Delhi’s reaction to the 
public uprisings in the Gulf States was influenced by 
the political and sectarian divide between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. Both are vital economic partners and 
India heavily depends on energy and trade with them 
and their respective spheres of influence. Hence, it 
is of utmost importance for India to steer clear of any 
involvement in this rivalry.
In this regard, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs 
reacted cautiously to the situation in Bahrain and 
Yemen, considering a clear Sunni-Shiite component in 









1. Algeria 450 10. Libya 15000
2. Bahrain 350000 11. Morocco 300
3. Egypt 3600 12. Oman 718642
4. Iran 4200 13. Qatar 500000
5. Iraq 9000 14. Saudi Arabia 1789000
6. Israel 78000 15. Syria 650
7. Jordan 7000 16. Tunisia 199
8. Kuwait 579390 17. United Arab
Emirates
1750000
9. Lebanon 10000 18. Yemen 111000
Table 2: Overseas Indians Living West Asia 
(as on May 2012)
Source: The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
both of them. The official stance, however, was clearly 
only directed at the 350,000 Indians living in Bahrain 
and the 111,000 living in Yemen. Instead of commenting 
on the political situation, once again the statement only 
touches upon the safety of Indian nationals. In spite of 
formally rejecting any kind of forceful intervention in the 
affairs of another country, the Indian government did 
not comment on the Saudi intervention in Bahrain. In 
fact, the Bahraini Foreign Minister was invited to visit 
India nearly two weeks after the involvement.28 During 
the opening remarks of the meeting with the Bahraini 
Foreign Minister, the protests or intervention were not 
even mentioned.
While the Indian government advised its Indian 
citizens to leave Yemen and offered assistance with 
homecoming, there was little demand from the Indian 
diaspora in this country. However, according to the 
Indian government, “In the last few days, only a handful 
of Indian nationals have sought assistance, from the 
Embassy of India, Sana’a, for travelling back to India.”29 
The operation ended in June 2011, with more than 
10,000 Indians remaining in the country. 
While one can analyze the responses where they exist, 
one can only speculate as to why the Indian government 
did not react to the other protests. Aside from the Iran-
Saudi divide and the general reluctance to involve itself 
in the internal matters of other states, there are two 
other reasons account for the lack of reaction. First, 
in countries such as Oman, that contains a large 
Indian community, protests were not strong enough 
to necessitate an official reaction. Second, the Indian 
economy’s capacity to reintegrate hundred thousand 
or even millions of returnees in the case of evacuation 
remains doubtful. Hence, instead of recognizing 
protests and possibly carrying the responsibility to 
evacuate, the Ministry of External Affairs chose not 
to react to protests in Kuwait altogether. Refraining 
from any political statements, the Indian government 
followed its tradition of non-interference and pursued 
its material interests in the region. 
A Curious Turn of Events: An Unfathomed Indian 
Interest in Syria and Libya
The uprisings took a somewhat more violent turn in 
Libya and Syria. Soon, they took the center stage in 
international discussions and media attention. Given 
the war-like situation in these countries, the UNSC took 
their cases more seriously than the other countries 
ravaged by protests. When India was part of the UNSC 
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between 2011 and 2012, it completed a total of eleven 
resolutions regarding these two countries. The Libyan 
and Syrian cases differed from all the other countries 
affected by the Arab uprisings in not only the number 
of resolutions passed but also in the content of the 
resolutions. Assets were frozen, sanctions issued, and 
a no-fly zone was implemented.    
       
As a non-permanent member, India was required 
to partake in the discussions leading up to those 
resolutions. As Table 3 shows, India’s voting behavior 
fluctuated from resolution to resolution. The strictly 
self-centered and non-interventionist strategy India 
employed in Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen would have 
translated into abstaining on all of those decisions. While 
it was able to pursue its pragmatic, non-interventionist 
agenda through its bilateral statements, India was 
apparently hindered from pursuing this strategy by its 
position in the UNSC. The following discusses India’s 
reactions to the Libyan and Syrian cases separately, 
attempting to explain why they diverge from other 
responses observed.
The Case of Libya 
India’s reaction toward Libya regarding the UN 
resolutions has been exemplary in terms of the 
dilemma it faces in the course of Arab Spring. In March 
2011, in adapting Resolution 1973, the UNSC offered 
to increase sanctions on Libya which suggested “no-
fly zone over Libya, authorized all necessary means to 
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Libya Content of Resolution India’s Voting Behavior




Resolution 1973 • Authorized military intervention in Libya in 
form of no-fly zone
• Panel to monitor embargo
Abstained
Resolution 2009 • Decided on United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
• Accepted “new” Libyan government
• Allowed transfer of weapons to new 
government
In favor
Resolution 2016 • Set termination date for Resolution 1973 In favor
Resolution 2017 • Stipulated prevention of proliferation of 
portable surface-to-air missiles, chemical 
weapons stockpiles and other small arms
In favor
Resolution 2022 • Extended UNSMIL mission In favor




• Condemned Syrian crackdown on 
protestors




• Condemning violence of Syrian regime In favor [China and 
Russia vetoed]
Resolution 2042 • Authorized military observers to Syria In favor
Resolution 2043 • Established UNSMIS In favor
Table 3: UNSC Resolutions on Libya and Syria
Source: UNSC Resolutions, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/
6India’s vote regarding the UN decisions on Libya was 
supportive of the UN endorsed action. The overall 
situation can be considered India’s dilemma faced in 
multilateral forums against its traditional policy line. 
The Case of Syria
In 2011, when the UNSC offered to put sanctions on 
Syria, India abstained along with Brazil, South Africa, 
and Lebanon.36 The resolution was blocked when 
Russia and China vetoed it. The Indian representative 
expressed that rather than taking part in an escalating 
crisis, India had been engaging in bilateral dialogue 
with Syria through collaborative and constructive ways. 
India also suggested that the international community 
give the Syrian government some time to develop 
political reforms. In addition, Hardeep Puri, India’s 
permanent representative to the United Nations, stated 
that:
“The resolution under the Council’s consideration 
does not accommodate our concern about the threat 
of sanctions. It does not condemn the violence 
perpetrated by the Syrian opposition. Nor does it place 
any responsibility on the opposition to abjure violence 
and engage with the Syrian authorities for redressal of 
their grievances through a peaceful political process. 
We have, therefore, abstained on the resolution.”37
India’s 2011 decision was very much influenced by the 
country’s strategy of not become directly involved in the 
conflicts. India’s policy line is to preserve a longer-term 
engagement with the situation and support stabilization 
in a gradual manner. 
However, the Indian approach towards the Syria 
conflict shifted in 2012. In February 2012, the United 
States, the U.K., and France as the permanent 
members of the UNSC proposed a second resolution, 
which would introduce sanctions against the Syrian 
regime unless Assad ceased targeting the civilians in 
his country.38 The Russian and Chinese vetoes were 
far from a surprise; however, India’s affirmative vote for 
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protect civilians by excluding a foreign occupation force 
of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”30
The resolution was approved by 10 votes including that 
of the United States, the UK, France, and Lebanon. 
While there was no opposite vote, India, Russia, China, 
Germany, and Brazil abstained. It has been claimed 
that before the resolution was put on the table, the 
United States and its allies UK and Germany engaged 
in several lobbying activities to build a consensus on 
the no-fly-zone.31 The media claimed that in spite of the 
alleged pressure from the US, India chose to abstain.32
  
Manjeev Singh Puri explained the reasons behind India 
abstaining from the vote. India would avoid making a 
decision regarding the resolution, since the UNSC did 
not receive the report in time to vote on the resolution. 
Furthermore, Puri stated that:
 “The report of that Envoy and that of others had not yet 
been received.  As a consequence, today’s resolution 
was based on very little clear information, including a 
lack of certainty regarding who was going to enforce 
the measures.  There must be certainty that negative 
outcomes were not likely before such wide-ranging 
measures were adopted.  Political efforts must be the 
priority in resolving the situation.”33
India’s decision regarding the resolution about the no 
fly-zone over Libya can be considered as a rational 
decision. Considering the Indian interests especially 
with regard to the BRICS countries, it is no coincidence 
that India abstained from the vote and sided with Brazil, 
Russia, and China. India’s decision indicated that the 
country did not act against the support of UNSC but 
rather against third party involvement which can block 
the “territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Libya.”34 
As indicated by Puri in the following year of Libyan 
uprising in the UNSC. The meeting on the Libyan case 
in the International Criminal Court in November 2012 
revealed the following:
“The international community, including the Security 
Council and the ICC, should fully assist the Libyan 
authorities in this process. This inclusive approach to 
national reconciliation, anchored in state sovereignty, 
is the only way to overcome the problems that Libya is 
presently facing…It is also important to ensure that all 
actions by the ICC Prosecutor should fall strictly within 
the ambit of Resolution 1970.”35
India’s policy line is to preserve 
a longer-term engagement 
with the situation and support 
stabilization in a gradual 
manner. 
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the resolution was nothing short of extraordinary. Puri 
explained that the decision was made with the aim of 
“facilitating the united actions” by the UNSC and the 
UN Special Envoy to Syria. In contrast to the speech 
given in 2011, Puri stated that:
“We voted in favour of the resolution today to facilitate 
a united action by the Security Council in support of the 
efforts of the Joint Special Envoy. In our view, it would 
have been preferable for the Council members to show 
flexibility so that a united message could be conveyed 
to all sides to the Syrian crisis instead of pursuance 
of domestic interests. It is, therefore, regrettable that 
the Council has not been able to adopt the resolution 
today and send a joint message that was sought by 
Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan”.39
India’s position towards Syria in the UNSC is a reflection 
of the dilemma it faces in multilateral venues to 
preserve its traditional policy line. The Libyan case was 
a learning process, causing India to be more cautious 
in its voting patterns on Syria. However, India followed 
its concerns over non-intervention and opposition to 
external involvement to the possible extent during its 
UNSC tenure.
Conclusion   
In this paper, we attempted to discover India’s position 
toward the Arab Spring. The challenging environment 
of the Arab Spring created instability in the region, 
which put India’s interests at risk. However, considering 
the stability in total trade rates of India with West Asia, 
India achieved to maintain its economic interests stable 
during the Arab Spring. Additionally, India’s foreign 
policy based on balancing politics between critical 
actors proved effective to a considerable level. One 
challenge to India has been to preserve a balance 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to protect 
energy and economic relations in bilateral relations, and 
keep itself away from potential traps of the escalating 
rivalry between these states in India’s relations with the 
Gulf countries and beyond.  
Regarding the diaspora issue, India employed a low-key 
policy of taking care of their basic security requirements 
and used diplomatic channels to ask for the return of 
its citizens if necessary. India’s partial deviation from 
its non-interventionist path in Syria and Libya cases is 
due to its non-permanent tenure in the UNSC during 
the height of the Arab Spring. India’s approach is a 
mixture of pragmatic and nationalist outlooks of foreign 
policy, which succeeded to defend India’s priorities to a 
considerable extent. 
However, we realized that the Arab Spring brought 
to the forefront a dilemma in Indian foreign policy, 
which struggles to reconcile regional and multilateral 
affairs in an era of global turmoil. India attempted to 
pursue effective bilateral relations towards the Arab 
Spring in an ambiguous multidimensional framework. 
It avoided taking bold positions in the struggles 
within the Arab countries. This approach is closely 
related to foreign policy strategies which favor non-
alignment and non-interventionism. There is a clear 
shift to West Asia in Indian foreign policy regarding 
sizeable economic and substantial security interests. 
The political transformation and failure of the regional 
order forced Indian policy makers to reconsider their 
policies. They faced a situation of securing their 
interests through employing their non-interventionist 
policy line in bilateral and regional platforms, while 
finding themselves making a decision on these issues 
in multilateral platforms.    
Our paper suggests that India’s choice is to follow 
the pragmatic non-interventionist policy line with an 
effective and multidimensional policy framework as 
a continuation of emerging West Asian policy. The 
problem is the international and, to a lesser extent 
internal, pressure India feels as the most populated 
democracy in taking a position in popular struggles 
against authoritarian rulers. India’s 2011-12 tenure 
at the UNSC as a non-permanent member made 
its attitude more visible which further complicated 
the situation for Indian policy makers. India avoided 
multilateral and domestic pressures and adopted a 
self-centered non-interventionist policy toward the Arab 
Spring. However, India’s current West Asia policy does 
not mean it overcomes the dilemma between traditional 
policy line and India’s search for a role in multilateral 
international system. Although the Indian dilemma goes 
beyond the Arab Spring, one would assume that India 
would face the necessity to bridge the gap between 
traditional preferences and the emerging situation in 
the West Asia region.
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